Within the philosophy of language, names and descriptions are traditionally taken to represent different paradigms of reference. Many philosophers draw a sharp contrast between the way speakers use names to talk about individuals and the way they use definite descriptions to do so. A proper name is used to pick out one specific individual.
names do not. Here is an example in which a definite description has what is normally considered a scope ambiguity with a modal operator.
(1) Mary-Sue could have been married to the president.
Imagine (1) being uttered in a situation in which Grover Cleveland is the president. On one reading, (1) could be made true by a possible situation in which a) Grover Cleveland is married to Mary-Sue and b) Grover Cleveland is not president. This is the wide-scope reading of "the president" since it picks out the individual satisfying the role in the actual world, regardless of whether he satisfies it in the possibilities considered. On another reading, (1) could be true because of a possible situation in which Mary-Sue is married to someone else, say Jake, who is president in that possible situation. This is the narrow-scope reading of "the president" since the description picks up its referent within the possible situation considered.
Consider, by contrast, what happens if we replace the description in (1) with a proper name:
(2) Mary-Sue could have been married to Grover Cleveland.
There is no way of understanding (2) This paper centers on a simple observation: scope ambiguities between definite descriptions and modal operators are only sometimes available (or, at least, are only sometimes apparent). It turns out that the narrow-scope readings of definite descriptions within modal operators are only available when the common ground-the mutual beliefs of the conversational participants-includes the proposition that across a wide range of possible situations the descriptive content has a unique satisfier.
One task of this paper is to give a principled explanation of this observation. What in the different worlds over which the modal operator quantifies. The truth of (3) is then established by the existence of a possible world in which the description "the teacher of Alexander" picks out someone besides Aristotle. In that possible world, Aristotle is not the teacher of Alexander. By contrast, the wide-scope reading of the description could not possibly be true. This is because, on the wide-scope reading, "the teacher of Alexander" picks out its referent in the actual world. But, in this case, it picks out Aristotle and the sentence would then assert that in some possible world Aristotle is not Aristotle, which is false.
Before moving on let me make a cautionary note. Sometimes the narrow-scope reading of a sentence containing a description and a modal may not be distinguishable from the wide-scope reading. If the sentence only quantifies over possible worlds across which one and the same person satisfies the description, it will be impossible to tell from the truth-conditions of the sentence whether the description within it takes narrow or wide scope. For this reason, all of my claims about when we can or cannot get a narrow-scope reading of a sentence apply only to contexts in which the different scopes have an effect on the truth-conditions of the sentence.
Role-type vs. Particularized Descriptions
Example (3) in the previous section demonstrates that some definite descriptions have narrow-scope readings under modal operators. But the modal argument, as we shall see, relies on the claim that this is generally true of definite descriptions and this is the claim I wish to dispute. In order to do so, I need to make a distinction between two kinds of definite descriptions, which I call role-type and particularized descriptions.
One conceptual tool necessary to formulate this distinction is the idea of the common ground.
3 The common ground consists of all the propositions that are taken for granted by all the participants in a conversation. When I am talking to someone in a train 3 Robert Stalnaker, "Pragmatic Presupposition" in M. K. Munitz and P. K. Unger, eds., Semantics and Philosophy (New York: NYU, 1974) ; "Assertion" in P. Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9 (New York: Academic Press, 1978) ; "Common Ground," Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (2002): 701-721.
station, for instance, the proposition that we are in a train station is generally part of the common ground. A proposition need not actually be believed to count as part of the common ground, but the participants must at least pretend to believe it or must use it as a working assumption. There is also an iterative aspect to the common ground:
When a proposition is in the common ground it is not only mutually assumed to be true by participants of a conversation, but also mutually assumed to be mutually assumed to be true, and mutually assumed to be mutually assumed to be mutually assumed to be true, and so on.
A description is a role-type description if it is part of the common ground that there is exactly one person (or one salient person) satisfying the descriptive content across a range of relevant metaphysically possible situations and that the satisfier sometimes varies from situation to situation. 4 Some examples of role-type descriptions are "the family lawyer," "the mayor," "the president," "the tallest pilot," and "the director."
With role-type descriptions, we usually know independently of the specific conversational situation that the descriptive content is satisfied uniquely across other possible situations: It is part of general knowledge that cities generally have one mayor, countries one president, and so on. Of course, many role-type descriptions are incomplete in the sense that they need to be augmented by an implicit specification of the particular role in question-so, for instance, "the president" might be used to mean "the president of the US" or the "the president of the board of trustees." Likewise superlative descriptions, such as "the tallest man," require some domain within which they operate: "the tallest man" might mean "the tallest man in the room," or "the tallest man in the galaxy."
But the basic criterion stands: a role-type description is a description for which it is part of the common ground both that the content of the (completed) description is uniquely satisfied across a wide range of possible situations and that the satisfier varies amongst these situations.
Particularized descriptions are simply those descriptions that are not role-type de-scriptions. The mark of a particularized description, then, is that it is not part of the common ground that the descriptive content has a unique but varying satisfier across a whole range of relevant metaphysically possible situations. Descriptions whose only content consists in general properties shared by many different individuals tend to be particularized descriptions, such as, "the tall boy," "the dog," and "the loose-fitting cap." Descriptions that refer to people by their physical location or what they did at some point are also usually particularized, such as, "the man I met yesterday," "the person over there," and "the cat in the basement." The reason these descriptions count as particularized-in ordinary contexts-is that we can only know that there is a single most salient individual satisfying the descriptive content (and thus the description picks some individual out) by having some sort of knowledge particular to the narrow conversational context (e.g. for "the tall boy" we must know that there happens to be exactly one tall boy around). I might further note that particularized descriptions may also be "incomplete" in the sense that one might naturally fill out descriptions like "the tall man" with extra information such as "in this room." descriptions. I discuss these points in greater detail in Section 4.)
As it happens, there is interesting evidence of the linguistic significance of my distinction. Christopher Lyons reports that a northern Frisian dialect, Fering, seems to mark the distinction by using different articles to signify descriptions of the two sorts.
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Here is what he says about the use of the two definite determiners-the D-and the
A-articles-in Fering:
In general the D-article is used where the identity of the referent is to be found by searching the spatio-temporal or textual context. The referent, or a prior reference to it, is there to be picked out, and in some cases distinguished from other entities satisfying the same description. . . . The A-article is used as a role-type one, and where, given the hearer's general knowledge or knowledge of the wider situation and of appropriate associations, the description is enough to single out the referent without the need for ostension.
(p. 163)
Whatever one thinks of the D-article, the A-article is used to mark descriptions that 7 I think one can generalize the notion of role-type and particularized descriptions to epistemically possible situations in addition to metaphysically possible ones, though I do not explore that here.
seem a lot like role-type descriptions. So there is evidence that role-type descriptions form a natural pragmatic category capable of being marked in a language with its own article.
Role-type and Particularized Descriptions with Modals
Now, as we have seen, role-type descriptions allow narrow-scope readings with respect to modal operators, as in (3), repeated here:
(3) Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander.
The description from (3), "the teacher of Alexander" can easily be a role-type description since it can be part of the common ground that across a wide range of possible worlds
Alexander would have had a teacher, but not necessarily the same teacher (for example, a different student of Plato might have been chosen instead to be Alexander's teacher).
The question I turn to now is whether particularized descriptions exhibit the same sort of behavior with regard to modal operators as role-type descriptions do.
Let's look at an example. Suppose that I went to a reception at the Met last night.
At the reception, we can suppose, I talked to many different people for brief periods of time. Now, suppose that I learn that my old friend Hans was due to come to the reception but that he didn't make it because his plane was delayed. Let us suppose that for this reason it is a relevant possibility that Hans could have made it to the reception, and that, if this were the case, I would have talked to him all night at the reception.
This possible situation, if it were actual, is one which I could aptly describe with this sentence:
(4) Hans is the person I talked to the whole time.
Now suppose that I want to express to someone at the party that I consider (4) to be a possibility. One might think that I could do this by uttering a version of (4) with a possibility modal:
(5) Hans might have been the person I talked to the whole time.
There is, however, something very odd about using (5) to express the possibility of a situation in which (4) is true (assuming there is actually no one who I talked to the whole time). Indeed, if I utter (5) at the party, I will probably confuse my audience.
(I will discuss a bit later how one might try to make sense of such utterances.) This oddness is quite surprising, however. If the definite description "the person I talked to the whole time" can have scope within the modal operator, then we would expect that (5) would express the possibility of a situation within which (4) Siegfried by an utterance of (6). This is true even if it is is possible that Siegmund could have come and Siegfried not come. In this possible situation, of course, Siegmund would have been the only person fasting. Nonetheless, it does not seem like (6) can easily express the proposition that there is a possible situation in which I would have enjoyed talking to whoever was unique in fasting at the dinner, Siegmund, Siegfried or someone else entirely. In this respect we cannot easily get the narrow-scope reading of the description "the person fasting through the dinner."
We can, however, create conversational backgrounds within which "the person I talked to the whole time" has a narrow-scope reading in (5) and "the person fasting through the dinner" has a narrow-scope reading in (6). First take (5) again:
Suppose that it is part of the common ground that I generally talk to one person throughout an entire evening (because, for instance, I always start an argument with someone about politics which lasts the whole evening). In this case, I could utter (5) in order to express the proposition that if Hans had come he would have filled the role of being the person I talked to all night. However, this is a case in which "the person I talked to the whole time," which would usually be a particularized description, acts as a role-type description since it indicates a role which is uniquely filled across many relevant counterfactual situations.
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The situation is similar for (6):
(6) I might have enjoyed talking to the person fasting through the dinner.
If we can take it for granted that there is usually exactly one person fasting at such dinners, or that the organizers had intended to invite exactly one person who wouldn't eat, though not any specific person, then the narrow-scope reading of (6) is available.
However, without such an assumption the reading is very hard to get.
10 I can only think of one other circumstance in which the description "the man I talked to the whole time" could have a non-rigid, narrow-scope reading in an utterance of (5). This other case is the one in which the description "the person I talked to the whole time" has already been introduced in either its definite or indefinite form in the conversation. For instance, instead of just saying (5) I might have said (1):
(1) I could have talked to a person the whole time. Hans might have been the person I talked to the whole time.
If I utter (1) it seems that the description in the second sentence can have a narrow-scope reading, and thus the utterance might express something true. However, in this case, the definite description is anaphorically linked to the indefinite description that precedes it. I want to put aside these anaphoric uses of descriptions as they involve the description inheriting properties from the original use.
We have seen, then, that in order to get a narrow-scope reading of a definite description we need to treat it as a role-type one. Sometimes in response to an utterance the audience changes their assumptions, and, hence the common ground through the process of accommodation. 11 This process of accommodation can lead the audience to treat a description as a role-type one even if prior to the utterance it is not part of the common ground that the description designates a role. Here is an example in which such accommodation might occur. Suppose I utter (7) when discussing a party I have just been to: There is a natural reading of (8) pp. 339-59; and Stalnaker, "Common Ground."
Role-type/Particularized and Adverbs of Quantification
Particularized and role-type definite descriptions also differ in their behavior with respect to adverbs of quantification, such as "sometimes", "usually", and "generally." Role-type descriptions easily allow quantification over different satisfiers whereas particularized descriptions do not:
(9) The best student is usually reclusive.
(10) The mayor is usually a Republican.
(11) The man in the car is usually nice.
(12) The tall solider from France is usually violent.
Both (9) and (10) exhibit two different readings corresponding to whether or not the descriptions get their reference under the adverb of quantification. One reading of (9) has it that a particular student, who is the best, usually acts reclusively; on the other reading, most of the students who are the best, say in different years or classes, are reclusive. (10) exhibits a similar ambiguity. The situation is different with (11) and (12), which prefer to be read as being about one particular person. For example, in (11), "the man in the car" must pick out the actual person satisfying the description, unless it can be taken for granted that there is a entire class of relevant situations in which there is exactly one man in a car. In other words, the description "the man in the car" must act as a role-type one in order to get narrow scope. Likewise, to get (12) to quantify over different individuals one has to imagine there being a recognized role:
the tall solider from France.
The generalization is that role-type descriptions but not particularized descriptions can have narrow scope with respect to modal operators and adverbs of quantification.
The explanation of this observation requires us to delve into some of the details of different accounts of descriptions. In the next section I sketch the Russellian account and argue that it does not provide us with the tools needed to explain the data.
Russell's approach was to treat definite descriptions as a form of quantifier. 12 While the indefinite description, "an F" simply introduces existential quantification, ∃xFx, into a rendering of the meaning of a sentence in first-order logic, the definite description is more complicated.
13 Russell claimed that definite descriptions are used to assert not just that there is an x such that Fx but also that there is only one x such that Fx. So, we can say that "the F" expresses something equivalent to ∃x(Fx&∀y(Fy → y = x)). I will abbreviate all this as [ιx : Fx] . These quantifiers are introduced into a logical form of a sentence, which, for our purposes here, is a representation in logical notation (or something approximating logical notation) of a proposition that can be expressed by the sentence. Cambridge: MIT, 1985) . However, for our purposes these syntactically oriented reformulations of the Russellian view are not relevantly different from the standard Russellian view. This is
As an example consider this sentence:
(13) A man met the president.
The Russellian may render this sentence thus:
Or alternatively, he may render it thus:
(15) [ιy : presidenty] ∃x x met y.
The only relevant quantifiers at work here are existential quantifiers. Since commuting existential quantifiers has no effect on meaning, these different scopes for the definite description do not, in this case, correspond to different truth-conditions for the sentence.
But this is not always the case. As we shall see, the different scopal readings predicted by the Russellian often do correspond to different truth-conditions for a sentence.
Now consider modal operators. We can treat modal operators as functions that take propositions and return propositions. There are two kinds of modal operators, the necessity operator, ✷, and the possibility operator, . If we take these operators to have their standard meanings, ✷ returns a proposition that is true in a world w just in the case the input proposition is true in all the worlds possible with respect to w and returns a proposition that is true in a world w just in case the input proposition is true in at least one world possible with respect to w.
The Russellian view of descriptions in combination with this quantificational view of modal operators predicts that there will be certain systematic ambiguities in sentences that contain descriptions under modal operators. Here is a sentence containing a description and a modal operator:
(16) The president might have been wise.
There are at least two different readings for (16): On one reading, it says of the actual president that there is a possible world in which he or she is wise. This reading is especially true because there are few known syntactic restrictions on the scope of definite descriptions.
captured by the formula (17) on which "the president" takes wide scope over the modal operator:
On the other reading of (16), the sentence is true just in case there is a possible world in which the person who is president within that possible world is wise, whoever he or she may be. The logical form of this reading is captured by the formula in which the description gets scope under the modal operator:
A major attraction of the Russellian view of definite descriptions is that it predicts the appearance of these readings by allowing quantifiers to have different scopes on different readings of a given sentence.
But, it is this very mechanism of quantifier scope-taking that creates problems for the Russellian approach and its descendants. The Russellian view makes the primafacie prediction that, for a given sentence, both higher and lower scope with respect to a metaphysical modal operator will be available to a definite description. We have seen already, however, that definite descriptions do not generally exhibit scope ambiguities with modal operators: They do so only when the descriptions are role-type ones. The
Russellian view provides no obvious means for explaining why these different scopes are only sometimes available: any mechanism generating these different scopes should, as far as the Russellian is concerned, apply equally well to particularized and role-type descriptions. So the Russellian account, at first blush, makes the wrong prediction.
To make this argument clearer, it is worth considering a sentence with a description, which, in most contexts, lacks a scope ambiguity:
(19) I might have married the deserter.
Someone who accepts the Russellian account of descriptions should expect there to be a scope ambiguity between the two quantificational devices, "the" and "might." The Russellian ought to anticipate both a wide-scope reading, on which the sentence says that I might have married the unique actual deserter, and a narrow-scope reading, on which it says that there is a possible situation in which I marry a person who is unique in deserting in that situation. But, this second reading is obviously not available, unless we build in enough background information to turn the description "the deserter" into a role-type one.
15 So it turns out that (19) is ambiguous only in certain contexts (i.e.
only in combination with certain common grounds).
In response, the Russellian could suggest that the narrow-scope reading is unavailable in these contexts for pragmatic reasons; after all, not every reading of a conceivably ambiguous sentence is always found in every conversational context. But for an appeal to pragmatics to provide more than just a hand-wavy avoidance of criticism, a serious account of the data must be provided.
One such account might claim that the proposition expressed by the narrow-scope reading is only plausibly assertable in cases where the description is a role-type one.
But I doubt that this is correct. Consider, for instance, these examples:
(20) Saint-Simon could have been the man I met at the zoo.
(21) Filibert could have been the person in court.
The Russellian predicts very sensible narrow-scope readings for both of these sentences.
Let us restrict our attention to the metaphysical readings of the modals. The sentence (20), on the narrow-scope reading, asserts that Saint-Simon could have been a man I met at the zoo and been unique in being so; (21) In this section, I argue that a presuppositional account of definite descriptions explains the data concerning the scope of descriptions with respect to modal operators.
Presuppositions and Descriptions
I use "presupposition" to refer to an empirical phenomenon, not to any particular technical account of that phenomenon.
17 When a proposition is presupposed by a statement, the statement seems to suggest or imply the proposition without exactly asserting it.
Take this sentence:
(22) John went to the DMV too.
An utterance of (22) seems to carry some sort of strong commitment to the proposition that someone besides John went to the DMV: It would be ludicrous to assert (22) and assert that one person might have been another person. Of course, the descriptions in (20) and (21) may get narrow-scope readings if we think of the modals in the sentences as having epistemic force. I would argue that in these cases the descriptions act as role-types ones with respect to the epistemically possible worlds that the epistemic modals quantify over. However, I cannot defend this view here. to deny in the next breath that anyone besides John went to the DMV. Yet (22) does not assert the proposition to which it is in this way committed-nor could it happily be used to assert this proposition. Consider also this sentence:
(23) My niece is a professional lutenist.
As in the case of (22), an utterance of (23) wouldn't seem, intuitively, to be an assertion that the speaker has a niece, though such an utterance would certainly imply it.
Expressions giving rise to this phenomenon-expressions like "too" and "my X" -are known as presupposition triggers. One striking feature of this class of expressions is that any presupposition that they trigger survives embedding under negation. Consider for instance the negation of (23): (24) It's not the case that my niece is a professional lutenist Someone who utters (24) would still seem committed to the proposition that he has a niece. This phenomenon whereby a presupposition survives some operation on a sentence is called presupposition projection. And it occurs under other operators besides negation. Consider, for instance, the difference in semantic contribution between an assertion combined with a pronoun, "I have a wife and she. . . ," and the simple noun phrase, "My wife. . . ," in different contexts:
(25) a. If I had a wife and she were rich I wouldn't be in debt.
b. If my wife were rich I wouldn't be in debt. In (25b)-(27b) above, the presupposition that I have a wife survives the embedding within, respectively, a conditional, an interrogative, and a modal context. This accounts for the difference in meaning between all of the pairs above. It is the basic mark of presupposition triggers that the presuppositions they generate are projected in this way.
But, the details of projection phenomena, and the exact characteristics of the contexts in which it does and does not occur, go far beyond the scope of this paper.
It is widely supposed that uses of definite descriptions trigger presuppositions. In fact, definite descriptions were the expressions first observed to exhibit presuppositional behavior and the expressions for which the notion of presupposition was developed.
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On the standard view, definite descriptions trigger the presupposition that there is a unique satisfier of the descriptive content in the contextually relevant domain. On a competing view, definite descriptions trigger the presupposition that there is a maximally salient item satisfying the descriptive content in the contextually relevant domain. 19 The differences between the two accounts of the content of the presuppositions of definite description are not very important for this discussion, and I will often switch between them.
I want to put aside, in this context, the case of felicitous uses of non-referring definite descriptions such as this:
(28) I didn't see the king of France at Versailles, because there is no king of France.
There is much to say about such cases, but they do not challenge the basic observation that definite descriptions generally give rise to presuppositions of existence and uniqueness/familiarity. 20 For one thing, we can say that in sentences like (28) In response to such problems, we might instead treat the presupposition that a definite description triggers as an additional feature distinct from its normal truthconditional content. In this case, we could maintain the Russellian account of definite descriptions and tack on to it the claim that definite descriptions also trigger presuppositions of existence and uniqueness. There are two problems with such a move. First of all, it leads to a redundancy in our account of definite descriptions since we must now take them to both presuppose and assert existence and uniqueness. Second, the account does nothing to explain why definite descriptions trigger the particular presuppositions that they do.
In response to these problems we might instead suppose that a definite description is a term whose function is to pick out the thing that satisfies the presupposition (i.e.
the unique/uniquely salient thing satisfying the descriptive content issue of what exactly the semantic value of the description is-in particular whether it is exhausted by the object it refers to or rather involves a mode of presentation. I elaborate on these issues in section 4, below.)
(1) The mayor could be a woman.
(2) ∃ world w, s.t. [the unique mayor in w] is a woman.
On the wide-scope reading we simply attach the description to the actual world, @, instead of letting it be bound by the modal operator:
(3) ∃ a world w, s.t. [the unique mayor in @] is a woman.
Alternatively, we can use the approach of van der Sandt and Beaver and treat the presupposition itself as scoping to different positions while binding a variable that is left in the place of the description. In the following examples I use x to represent this variable, while putting the presupposition in parentheses and allowing its location to determine where it gets satisfied. Here is the narrow-scope reading, with the presupposition staying within the modal operator:
(4) (∃x, x is a unique mayor) and x is a woman.
On the wide-scope reading, the presupposition simply comes out of the modal operator into the front of the sentence:
(5) (∃x, x is a unique mayor) x is a woman.
Modals, Adverbs of Quantification, and Presuppositions
My goal in this section is to explain the fact that only role-type descriptions can have narrow scope under modal operators. I'll do this by appealing to the presuppositional view of definite descriptions I have just presented.
First, I want to illustrate the general idea by looking at adverbs of quantificationexpressions like "always" and "usually"-and then I will move on to modal operators.
Adverbs of quantification can be treated as quantificational expressions that are very similar to modals. While modal operators quantify over possible worlds, adverbs of quantification quantify over situations-where a situation is something smaller than an entire world. 26 A sentence of the form "always X" is, on this approach, equivalent to a sentence of the form "in all situations, X." (Just as, on the usual quantificational approach to modality, "it must be the case that X" is equivalent to "in all possible worlds X.")
As we saw in Section 1.3, definite descriptions exhibit scope ambiguities with respect to adverbs of quantification. Consider, for instance, this sentence:
(31) The mayor is always happy.
On the wide-scope reading, (31) is used to make a statement about the current mayor and says that in all (relevant) situations he or she is happy. On the narrow-scope reading, (31) is used to assert that in any relevant situation, whoever the mayor is in that situation, he or she is happy. Now, as I explained above, any use of a definite description triggers some sort of presupposition, perhaps a presupposition to the effect that there is a uniquely salient satisfier of the descriptive content. Whether a particular use of a definite description is felicitous or not will depend on whether the presupposition is part of the common ground (i.e. is one of the mutual assumptions of the conversational participants) or can be added to the common ground through accommodation. In other words, what a speaker presupposes, his audience must be capable of assuming.
When a definite description appears under an adverb of quantification we add, so to speak, an extra layer of presupposition. To see how this is so, consider first the narrowscope reading of the definite description "the mayor" under the adverb of quantification "always" in (31). According to the semantics of adverbs of quantification I am using here, to determine whether the sentence on this reading is true we would need to check the truth of the embedded sentence ("the mayor is happy") in all the relevant situations.
In other words, the truth of the narrow-scope reading of (31) depends on the truth of (32) over a class of relevant situations:
(32) The mayor is happy. Now, normally, any use of "the mayor" triggers the presupposition that in the relevant circumstance there is one salient satisfier of the descriptive content, i.e. that there is one salient mayor. However, the narrow-scope reading of (31) does not just include one use of the description "the mayor." By this I mean that the description is not just used once to pick out an object. Rather an utterance of (31), on the narrow-scope reading of the description, makes use of the description to pick out an object in every situation being quantified over. So the presupposition of (31), on its narrow-scope reading, is that across all the relevant situations there is a unique mayor. Thus, when one intends (31) to have this narrow-scope reading, the audience must assume, or be capable of assuming, that this presupposition is satisfied (i.e. that across every relevant situation there is a unique mayor).
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27 This point also follows from any view which treats definite descriptions as having partially defined semantic values. If one treats definite descriptions as undefined when they have no unique referent (as on the semantic approach to presupposition), then (31) on the narrow-scope reading will be undefined unless there is a unique mayor in all the relevant situations.
The situation is different with the wide-scope reading of the description in (31). For if we intend (31) to have this reading we pick out the mayor salient in our current context and assert that he or she is happy in all the relevant situations. In this case the description is only being put to one use in the sentence: it picks out the actual mayor.
So this sentence does not generate any extra presuppositions through the interaction of the definite description and the adverb of quantification. The sentence is fine as long as the common ground includes the proposition that there is a salient mayor, or as long as that proposition can be accommodated.
The critical point here is that, generally, a sentence for which the definite description is read as having wide scope with respect to an adverb of quantification triggers a different presupposition from a sentence for which the definite descriptions is read as having narrow scope. On the narrow-scope reading, the sentence triggers the presupposition that across all the relevant situations there is a unique satisfier of the descriptive content.
On the wide-scope reading, by contrast, the sentence just triggers the presupposition that in the actual situation there is a unique satisfier of the descriptive content.
My central claim is that the different presuppositions of the sentence on the narrowand wide-scope readings, respectively, determine which readings are available in a given conversational context. When a sentence is ambiguous and its different possible readings have different presuppositions, then we are only be able to get the reading(s) whose presupposition can be accommodated. Now, a particularized description is a description for which it is not assumed that there is a unique satisfier across the relevant situations.
If the relationship between the common ground and the descriptive content has this feature then one cannot, without accommodation, get the narrow-scope reading of the description under an adverb of quantification. In such a case either the common ground must be changed (making the description a role-type one) or the other, wide-scope reading will be the only one available.
Consider, for instance, this sentence:
(33) The man from Apple is often troublesome. This sentence fails to have a narrow-scope reading in normal contexts when the modal has metaphysical force: (34) cannot easily be read to mean that Susan's actual husband might have been unique in wearing a big red hat. 28 The presupposition of the sentence with the narrow-scope reading is that in each possible world there is a unique, but potentially varying satisfier of the description. 29 However, in normal situations there is not an easily accessible set of possible worlds such that in each world some (different) person is wearing a big red hat. Of course, there are many metaphysically possible worlds where just one person is wearing a big red hat (in the relevant situation), but they do not form a natural modal domain that we can quantify over with modal operators.
28 It has a natural narrow-scope reading if we read the modal epistemically, however, epistemic modals raise different issues since the sets of worlds they quantify over are radically different. 29 This assumes that the truth of the sentence depends upon what happens in all possible worlds, rather than just one possible world. This fact does not follow directly from the semantics of possibility modals since they are used to make an assertion of the form "there exists a possible world such that
x." However, I would argue that, for semantic or pragmatic reasons, existential modals are nonetheless used to make statements about entire sets of possible worlds.
Moreover, the presupposition of the sentence on the narrow-scope reading, i.e. that in every relevant possible world there is unique person wearing a big red hat, is a bit too peculiar to come easily into play through accommodation, explaining our preference for the wide-scope reading. And, if we nonetheless accommodate this presupposition, the description becomes a role-type one.
The situation is different when we have, under a modal operator, a description like "the president." Here, the narrow-scope reading is easily accessible:
(35) The president of the company might have been nicer.
The narrow-scope reading is available because we can naturally think that over a relevant set of possibilities the company would have had some president or other in each possibility. When we think of the modal as quantifying over these possibilities, the description "the president of the company" can get narrow scope with respect to the modal.
Let me review what I have been arguing. First, the Russellian account does not predict the systematic scope variations definite descriptions show with respect to modal operators. This is because the Russellian should, all else equal, expect that in any sentence with a modal operator and a description there is a scope ambiguity between them. Moreover, the limited distribution of readings that we find cannot easily be explained by pragmatics alone.
Second, presuppositional accounts of descriptions can explain the distribution we find. Adverbs of quantification and modal operators quantify over sets of situations (or worlds). Descriptions can get narrow scope if and only if the presupposition that there is a unique satisfier in every situation is satisfied. If this presupposition is satisfied, or can be accommodated, then we can get the narrow-scope reading, otherwise, we only get the wide-scope reading on which the description refers to an object in the current context.
Definite Descriptions and Propositional Content
Before moving on, I want to relate what I have said about definite descriptions to some general issues within the philosophy of language. Much of the work there is situated within a theoretical framework which derives from Frege and Russell. One of the central features of this framework is the view that utterances of sentences in contexts are used to communicate abstract objects called propositions. The philosophical literature on definite descriptions and proper names-the relation between the two being the subject of the remainder of this paper-focuses on the contribution these expressions make to the propositions expressed by utterances of sentences including them. On one popular conception, sentences containing singular terms can sometimes be used to communicate object-dependent propositions. These are propositions about some particular object. To put it graphically, the object itself-rather than just properties of the object-is part of these propositions. For instance, one might think that if there is a woman standing a few feet in front of me, I can say something like (36) to communicate a proposition about the woman herself, rather than about whoever might satisfy the description I use:
(36) The woman in front of me may be a journalist.
Other uses of singular terms in sentences do not communicate propositions about any particular object but speak about an object only by specifying some property it has.
For instance, one can talk about "the owner of this car, whoever that might be." I will call propositions that are not about particular objects, general propositions.
The question I want to take up here is how the preceding discussion of the potential scope of definite descriptions relates to the philosophical discussion of the contribution of definite descriptions to propositions expressed using them. general propositions (which are called attributive uses of descriptions). For instance, "the president of the US" can be used to communicate an object-dependent proposition even when it functions as a role-type description.
(37) The president of the US likes madeira.
An utterance of (37) is potentially capable of expressing an object-dependent proposition about the current president of the US. So, it is not restricted to expressing a general proposition about the person happening to satisfy the description, despite the fact that the description itself is role-type. (38) The thief obviously liked Worcestershire sauce and thyme.
In these circumstances, by uttering (38), I may communicate a proposition about whoever satisfies a certain property, i.e. the property of being the unique thief in the current situation. But, the description is a particularized one, since in different (relevant) possible situations either the same (unknown) person satisfies the description or no one does.
Nonetheless, the difference between narrow-and wide-scope uses is correlated, to an extent, with the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Any description which in a given case receives narrow scope with regard to a modal operator is generally not used to express an object-dependent proposition. This is because there is not one object such a sentence is used to talk about; rather the description seems to pick out different objects in different possible situations. 32 Wide-31 Whether such uses of descriptions to express object-dependent propositions about individuals follow from the semantics of descriptions or rather depend on various pragmatic mechanisms, as Kripke suggests, is an entirely separate issue. 32 Unless, of course, the narrow-scope reading picks out the same person in all the possible situations in which case it could be used to communicate a singular proposition.
scope uses of definite descriptions need not, on the other hand, express object-dependent propositions. In the context of the potato salad calamity above I could also have said:
(39) The thief might have left a little potato salad for our breakfast.
There is obviously a wide-scope reading of the description "the thief" with respect to the modal "might." However, this reading need not correspond to a communication of an object-dependent proposition about some individual. Even with the wide-scope reading, (39) can be used to express a general proposition about whoever stole the potato salad. What I will argue for in the remainder of this paper is that, contra the philosophical orthodoxy on this question, facts about scope give us no reason to treat proper names any differently from definite descriptions.
Proper Names and the Modal Argument
An extremely influential argument in the philosophy of language, Kripke's modal argument, purports to show that proper names are not semantically equivalent to definite descriptions. 34 Here is one version of the argument:
1. Definite descriptions exhibit narrow-scope readings with respect to modal operators.
33 Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference; Neale, Descriptions. 34 Three pieces that seem to understand the argument this way are Linsky Oblique Contexts, ch. 7;
Stanley "Names and Rigid Designation"; Soames, Beyond Rigidity, ch. 2.
2. Proper names do not exhibit narrow-scope readings with respect to modal operators.
3. The meaning of a proper name cannot be the same as that of a definite description.
The argument depends upon the sort of observations I made in the introduction to this paper. Consider, for instance, (2), repeated here:
The modal argument begins by suggesting that on the hypothesis that "Grover Cleveland" is really semantically equivalent to some description, "the F," one should expect to find two possible readings of (2), corresponding to whether the description, "the F," gets its scope under the modal (finding the satisfier of the description within each possible situation) or outside the modal (picking out its actual satisfier, i.e. Grover Cleveland).
However (2) does not seem to exhibit different readings of this sort. So, the argument concludes, "Grover Cleveland" cannot be equivalent to "the F." The first premise in my presentation of the modal argument above states that definite descriptions exhibit narrow-scope readings with respect to modal operators. In this paper, however, I have presented and explained a significant qualification to this claim.
I have shown that only role-type descriptions can have narrow scope with respect to a modal operator. Thus, we need to revise our assessment of the modal argument in light of this qualification.
36
In fact, once we recognize that definite descriptions do not always exhibit scope ambiguities with respect to modal operators, the modal argument loses much of its 36 Kripke explicitly acknowledges the degree to which his argument depends on descriptions acting Russellian, and hence being able to get narrow scope (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 6, fn 8). Bart
Geurts ["Good News about the Description Theory of Names," Journal of Semantics, 14 (1997): 319-348 ] also picks up on this issue, arguing that names are like certain descriptions which always take wide scope (though he does not offer an account of why these descriptions take wide scope):
The presuppositions triggered by names seem to have a decidedly stronger tendency to 'take wide scope' than some others. In this respect, too, they are on a par with other descriptively attenuate 'incomplete', definites like 'the door' or anaphoric pronouns like 'it'.
Likewise, Dummett thinks that the modal argument lacks force because only some descriptions can have narrow scope within a modal operator. However, for some reason, he thinks the only descriptions that can take narrow scope are ones that appear after the copula:
We are now in a position to understand the grain of truth in Kripke's doctrine of proper names as rigid designators. For modal contexts in general, there is no relevant difference between proper names and definite descriptions: but the matter stands otherwise when the name of the descriptions is preceded by the verb 'to be' or 'to become'. [Dummett,
Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), p. 131.] This is wrong, however, as the following minimal pair shows:
(1) John might have made friends with the president.
(2) John might have made friends with Grover Cleveland.
Only in the case of the first sentence can one detect a scope ambiguity. So definite descriptions do not only differ from proper names after the copula. It's worth noting that this is a significantly larger qualification than the one in the previous section about rigidified descriptions. Descriptions like "the man in the corner"
are not rigidified descriptions since they have a predicative content which different individuals can satisfy in different situations. So, the class of definite descriptions that are generally particularized includes descriptions which are not rigidified. In addition, while it's extremely hard to find real English expressions that act as rigidified descriptions ("the actual mayor" certainly doesn't), it's extremely easy to find English expressions that are usually particularized descriptions.
Another way of putting my basic point is to say that the modal argument still leaves open the possibility that names are particularized descriptions. Of course, whether a description is particularized or role-type depends upon the relationship between the common ground and the predicative content of the description. So, a name is unlikely always to be a particularized description, but a name might be equivalent to a definite description that has a descriptive content which makes it particularized in most contexts.
This hypothesis would explain the resistance names show to taking narrow scope in most instances.
In the remainder of the paper I examine one particular descriptivist conception of names to see whether, according to this conception, names can be construed as particularized descriptions. I will also look at contexts in which, according to this descriptivist proposal, names do not act as particularized descriptions. By looking at these contexts we can assess whether, as the descriptivist should predict, names can sometimes get narrow scope with respect to modal operators. I will argue that-contrary to the philosophical orthodoxy-the descriptivist view does extremely well at predicting the potential scope of proper names with respect to modal operators.
Names as Metalinguistic Descriptions
The view that names are semantically equivalent to definite descriptions is often de- fact that "jump" means jump. In fact, the metalinguistic view of names makes a very strong claim: that each proper name has the same meaning as some particular definite description.
Definite descriptions trigger presuppositions; so, if proper names are equivalent to certain definite descriptions they will also trigger presuppositions. Earlier, I suggested that definite descriptions trigger the presupposition that there is a uniquely salient individual satisfying the descriptive content. So, if a name N were equivalent to the description "the bearer of N," then a use of N would trigger the presupposition that there is a uniquely salient person bearing N . It seems plausible that names carry this presupposition. For when we use a proper name usually we presuppose that there is a most salient person bearing the name. Without this presupposition we could not expect our audience to understand to whom we meant to refer.
Kripke in Naming and Necessity makes other powerful arguments, besides the modal argument, against the view that names are disguised descriptions. His strongest argument, to my mind, is one about speaker knowledge. Here is a version of this argument:
If the name "Plato" were synonymous with the description "the author of The Republic" then one would think that competent users of the name would have to know-at least implicitly-that Plato is the author of The Republic. However, it absurd to suppose that it is a condition on semantic competence with the term "Plato" that one know that "Plato" wrote The Republic.
I do not think the metalinguistic view succumbs to this argument about speaker knowledge. The knowledge that a person referred to by a name bears that name may well be part of every competent speaker's grasp of the meaning of the name. The only objection to this that I can see is the claim that children are able to use proper names without having sufficient conceptual resources to grasp descriptions like "the bearer of N ." There are a few things to be said about this. First, the conceptual capacities of very young children may be extremely sophisticated, so that the empirical claim may simply be false: children might, from their first uses of proper names, be in a position to grasp (in some sense) the descriptions associated with names. It is very hard to read "the president" in (40) as a wide-scope description while reading "the man called 'Havelock'" as a narrow-scope description-in other words it is hard to read the sentence as saying that the actual man who is now the current president might have had a different name. So, as we should expect given the conclusions I have reached, metalinguistic descriptions are extremely resistant to getting narrow scope.
Of course, in some contexts even metalinguistic descriptions will count as role-type descriptions. And in such cases, metalinguistic descriptions will be able to receive narrow-scope interpretations. Let us imagine a situation in which it is part of the common ground that there is always one, but not always the same, person bearing a particular name across different situations. Consider the name "M"-the name of the head of the British secret service in James Bond. "M" looks like a proper name, but if it is a proper name it is one which can get narrow scope with respect to modal operators:
(41) John might have become M. (42) and (43) invites a pragmatic explanation. This is because, proper names, generally, can get non-rigid narrow-scope readings within epistemic modals.
A pragmatic explanation of the difference between (42) and (43) could rely on the observation that if a definite noun phrase is repeated twice with the same intonation it is generally taken to have the same referent. And indeed if we raise the intonation on the second "Aristotle" from (43) we get a true reading:
(1) Aristotle might not have been ↑ARISTotle.
Critics of the descriptivist view would argue that this second use is special and somehow non-literal.
However, since what is being debated is whether or not names are descriptions, simply labeling all descriptive uses as non-literal is question-begging. In fact, emphasizing a word does not always make In these circumstances, it seems like it is quite easy to give the description a narrowscope interpretation.
The crucial test for the metalinguistic descriptivist view is whether proper names the use non-literal. One might rather think emphasis is meant to show that the two uses of the name are not meant to be taken as co-referential. A similar phenomenon occurs with pronouns in these examples.
(2) He went to the gym, and ↑HE went to the bathroom.
(3) He went to the gym, and he went to the bathroom.
So rising intonation can indicate that a word is being used for a different purpose, but not that the use is somehow non-literal or metalinguistic. Sorting out these issues would require more serious work on focus and intonation.
also allow narrow scope in such circumstances.
It is unclear what one should say about the sentence containing two proper names, (42), repeated below, when uttered in a context in which a Greek law of this sort is commonly known to be in effect.
(42) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.
I think it is perhaps less good than the sentence yielded by replacing the proper names with two definite descriptions:
(46) The man called "Aristotle" might not have been the man called "Aristotle."
But the difference between the felicity of these two sentences is very subtle, and both of these sentences are rather unnatural. A better example of a potential narrow-scope use of a proper name is a variation on (45):
(47) Aristotle could have been a sailor.
If there is a Greek law stipulating that there is always one and only one Aristotle at any given time, then (47) seems like it has a reading on which the name gets narrow scope. I am not sure whether, with the narrow-scope reading, (47) is less natural than (45) or not. In general, I am not sure where the weight of intuitions lies in these cases.
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However, I do not think the intuitions are weighty enough to form the basis of a serious argument against the view that names are semantically equivalent to metalinguistic definite descriptions.
We should not despair over the semantics of proper names just because our judgments of critical cases are hazy. The messiness of the data is not an obstacle to understanding proper names; it is just another piece of data in its own right. The question of whether proper names are particularized descriptions might not have a determinate answer. The right hypothesis may be that names are very similar to metalinguistic descriptions, but 45 One has to put aside the question-begging temptation-common in discussions of the modal argument-to label any narrow-scope use of a proper name as somehow special and, hence, irrelevant.
The important thing to note in this context is that the narrow-scope uses of some definite descriptions, the ones which are usually particularized such as that in (45), also sound slightly odd.
not exactly the same. That is, we may have a conventionally encoded bias towards particularized readings of the descriptive content that names bring with them.
What is important to see is that once we restrict our attention to the relevant 
Conclusion
I have argued here that definite descriptions and proper names can be treated as expressions designed to pick out entities that satisfy certain presuppositions. These presuppositions give rise to different scoping potential in different contexts under modal operators and adverbs of quantification. I think this position should be the default one, since it respects the basic intuition that singular terms including both descriptions and names share a deep semantic commonality. Since this view also provides a better analysis of the interaction of modals with definite descriptions and proper names, it has much to recommend it.
46 I am inclined to think linguistic usage (in speech or in the head) does not determinately fix the descriptive content of names. Thus, there is no fact of the matter about what the descriptive content of names is.
